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COMMENTS
LOUIsIANA CHILDREN'S CODE ARTICLE 808: A POSITIVE STEP ON
BEHALF OF LOUISIANA'S CHILDREN
I am a promise. I am a possibility. I am a promise with a
capital P. I am learnin' who I am, and I'm starting to say "I
can." I am a promise I can be anything I want to be.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the Louisiana Legislature enacted the Louisiana Children's
Code (Children's Code), 2 a comprehensive, self-contained compilation
of the laws in Louisiana governing the exercise of juvenile court juris-
diction. The compilation arranges the pre-existing statutes concerning
children into one source, eliminates inconsistencies between statutes,
clarifies ambiguities, and codifies certain constitutional commands as
developed by the jurisprudence. A codification of particular significance
is Children's Code article 808,1 which is found in the delinquency title4
and provides that "[aIll rights guaranteed to criminal defendants by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Louisiana,
except the right to jury trial, shall be applicable in juvenile court
proceedings brought under this Title." ' Arguably, Article 808 goes be-
yond mere codification of constitutional commands to create additional
rights for children beyond those already extended by the United States
and Louisiana Constitutions as currently interpreted.
This comment focuses upon article 808: what it does, what it means
with respect to a child's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination, how it is a positive step on behalf of Louisiana children and
whether in certain contexts it may need to be carried further so as to
extend to children greater protections than currently available to adults.
Exploration of the issues presented above shall proceed as follows:
Part I discusses what Article 808 means generally and with respect to
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Part II evaluates
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVEw.
1. 1 Am a Promise, a popular children's song.
2. 1991 La. Acts No. 325.
3. La. Ch.C. art. 808 (West 1991).
4. La. Ch.C. Title VIII (West 1991).
5. La. Ch.C. art. 808 (West 1991).
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Article 808's equation of the constitutional rights of children with those
of adults. And, part III examines whether, in certain contexts, children
should have greater protections than those currently available for adults.
Part III also presents some alternative procedures to those currently in
force in Louisiana that could insure more competent and knowing waivers
of Miranda rights by juveniles.
The purpose of this comment is to explore the significance of Article
808 in advancing children's constitutional rights and creating changes
in the administration of the juvenile justice system beyond those created
by the Supreme Court's constitutional domestication6 of the system.
These are important issues in our society where the juvenile crime rate
is increasing,1 the drug problem is multiplying exponentially, families
are disintegrating and the resources necessary to effectively intervene are
becoming increasingly scarce."
II. ARTICLE 808: WHAT IT DoEs
A. In General
1. Equates Children with Adults
Article 808 essentially equates children with adults insofar as con-
stitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments are concerned. The only exception to this equation is the
Sixth Amendment jury trial option which the article expressly excludes.
By equating children with adults in this manner, Article 808 goes
beyond the holdings of the United States Supreme Court on the issue
of the rights of accused juveniles in delinquency proceedings. In the
landmark delinquency case In re Gault, the Supreme Court held that a
child in the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding is entitled
to the constitutional protections of (1) advance notice of the charges;
(2) assistance of counsel; (3) opportunity to confront and cross-examine
witnesses; and (4) the privilege against self incrimination. 9 In reaching
this holding, the Supreme Court specifically noted that
[wje do not in this opinion consider the impact of these con-
stitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the
6. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1441 (1967). The Gault Court uses
this term to refer to its principle that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone," id. at 13, 87 S. Ct. at 1436, and its extension of certain
constitutional rights and procedural protections to accused juveniles in delinquency pro-
ceedings.
7. Ellis, The Deadliest Year Yet, Time, Jan. 13, 1992, at 18.
8. Riley, Corridors of Agony, Time, Jan. 27, 1992, at 48.
9. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
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juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire process
relating to juvenile "delinquents." For example, we are not here
concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable
to the pre-judicial stages (emphasis added) of the juvenile process
nor do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dis-
positional process.' 0
Subsequent to Gault, six more Supreme Court decisions examined
the constitutional rights of children in delinquency proceedings. Two of
these cases extend to children rights and protections equal to those to
which adults in criminal trials are entitled. The Court in In re Winship"
held that the stringent standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt"
was applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings just as it was ap-
plicable to criminal prosecutions. In Breed v. Jones, 2 the Court extended
the protection against double jeopardy to juveniles so that a criminal
prosecution of a juvenile subsequent to a delinquency adjudication based
on the same conduct is barred. The procedures extended in both of
these cases concern, as in Gault, the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency
proceeding.
In three of the remaining four cases, the Supreme Court essentially
ruled against extending additional rights to juveniles in delinquency
proceedings. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania," the Court held that a jury
trial option is not required in a delinquency proceeding,"1 despite the
mandatory nature of such an option for adults. In Schall v. Martin,"
the Court held that preventive detention for juveniles was constitutionally
acceptable even though the Court had previously held that such detention
of adults was unconstitutional.' 6 In New Jersey v. T.L.O.," the Court
held that the warrantless search of the purse of a juvenile by school
officials in a school setting without probable cause was constitutionally
acceptable even though such a search of the purse of an adult would
have been constitutionally unacceptable and would have resulted in the
exclusion of any evidence so obtained. The issues presented in the Schall
v. Martin' and New Jersey v. T.L.O.' 9 cases concerned the preadju-
10. Id. at 13, 87 S. Ct. at 1436.
II. 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
12. 421 U.S. 519, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975).
13. 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971).
14. Note that Louisiana Children's Code article 808 continues this tradition.
15. 467 U.S. 253, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
16. However, since that time, the Supreme Court has held that under certain cir-
cumstances preventive detention of adults is constitutionally acceptable. See U.S. v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
17. 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
18. 467 U.S. 253, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
19. 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
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dicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as did the next case, Fare
v. Michael C.20
In Fare v. Michael C.,21 although the Court did not actually deny
to juveniles a right enjoyed by adults in criminal proceedings,22 it did
hold that a juvenile's request to speak to his probation officer was not
an invocation of the juvenile's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. In addition, the Court held that the absence of a parent
or other interested adult at the time of the waiver of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination was not a per se invalidation
of the waiver and subsequent confession. In other words, the Court left
open the question of whether Miranda applied to the interrogation of
juveniles while slamming the door, at least temporarily, on the extension
of additional procedural protections to children beyond those applicable
to adults.
In summary, the United States Supreme Court has generally limited
to the adjudicatory stage of delinquency proceedings the extension to
children of constitutional rights and accompanying procedural protections
already guaranteed to adults. This selective approach to granting con-
stitutional rights to juveniles is consistent with the current Court's glaring
reticence with regard to making any dramatic, far-reaching holdings
which may apply a Gault-like analysis to the pre- and post-adjudicatory
stages of a delinquency proceeding.
In addition to going beyond the holdings of the United States
Supreme Court, Article 808, by its comprehensive nature, also goes
beyond the explicit holdings of the Louisiana Supreme Court. On a case
by case basis, Louisiana courts have not withheld from accused juveniles
any rights which were already possessed by accused adults, 2 with the
20. 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
21. Id.
22. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically declared that it had not yet made Miranda
applicable to juvenile proceedings. In speaking for the Court, Justice Blackmun stated:
Indeed, this Court has not yet held that Miranda applies with full force to
exclude evidence obtained in violation of its proscriptions from consideration
in juvenile proceedings, which for certain purposes have been distinguished from
formal criminal prosecutions (citation omitted). We do not decide that issue
today. In view of our disposition of this case, we assume without deciding that
the Miranda principles were fully applicable to the present proceedings.
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 n.4, 99 S. Ct. 2560, 2567 n.4 (1979).
23. See, e.g., in the Fourth Amendment arena, State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.
1975) (involving a school search where both a warrant and probable cause were held to
be required); State v. Hudson, 404 So. 2d 460 (La. 1981) (involving a home search where
the suppression issue was analyzed by the court in a manner indistinguishable from that
used in criminal cases);- and State ex rel. Maness v. Black, 434 So. 2d 143 (La. App.
5th Cir.), writ denied, 435 So. 2d 446 (1983) (involving a search incident to the arrest
of a juvenile where the analysis was again indistinguishable from that utilized in an adult
1144 [Vol. 52
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exception of the right to a jury trial.2 4 However, as a blanket proposition,
the Louisiana Supreme Court has never held that accused juveniles are
entitled to the same rights as accused adults.
2. Mirrors Adult Rights and Protections
Article 808 is designed to function like a chameleon, its mandates
ever changing to mirror those of its surroundings, namely the consti-
tutional rights and accompanying procedural protections granted to adults.
Thus, if a constitutional right or acompanying procedural protection has
been granted to adults, a separate grant of such a right to children
would be wholly superfluous." Conversely, a specific withholding of a
constitutional right to children while granting it to adults will have no
authority in Louisiana, at least not in a delinquency context. But it
should be noted that Article 808 only applies to constitutional rights,
whether they be federal or state in origin.
B. More Specifically, With Respect to the Fifth Amendment 26
In In re Gault, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to delinquency
suspects; however, the Gault holding was limited to the adjudicatory
stage of delinquency proceedings. In Fare v. Michael C.,27 the Supreme
Court specifically declared that it had not yet made Miranda applicable
to juvenile proceedings. In speaking for the Court, Justice Blackmun
stated:
Indeed, this Court has not yet held that Miranda applies
with full force to exclude evidence obtained in violation of its
prescriptions from consideration in juvenile proceedings, which
for certain purposes have been distinguished from formal crim-
inal prosecutions .... We do not decide that issue today. In
view of our disposition of this case, we assume without deciding
context).
In the Fifth Amendment arena, see State ex rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
In the Eighth Amendment arena, see State v. Franklin, 12 So. 2d 211 (La. 1943)
and State ex rel. Banks, 402 So. 2d 690 (La. 1981), rev'g. 409 So. 2d 277 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1981).
24. See State ex rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
25. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, III S. Ct. 1661 (1991) and La.
Ch.C. art. 817 and Comments.
26. La. Ch.C. art. 808 also has repercussions with respect to an accused juvenile's
Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights, but these will not be discussed in this
comment.
27. 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
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that the Miranda principles were fully applicable to the present
proceedings.28
Now, with the advent of Children's Code article 808, there is no
doubt that the mandates of Miranda, to the extent that they are still
applicable to adults, are also applicable to children in Louisiana. What
follows is a brief sketch of the operational principles currently applicable
to adults in the context of the Fifth Amendment -privilege against self-
incrimination. This sketch highlights what Children's Code article 808
means with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination.
1. Under the Federal Constitution
Although coerced confessions in federal prosecutions have been con-
stitutionally prohibited since before the start of the twentieth century,
constitutional limitations on the use of such confessions in state criminal
prosecutions have been in place only since 1936. The Supreme Court
developed the first such limitation on the states in Brown v. Mississippi
in 1936.29 The Court in Brown held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment means "that state action, whether through one
agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions. ' 30 Thus, the Court found that the use of a confession
obtained by the brutal beating of the defendant was so flagrant and
shocking that it violated the due process rights of the defendant under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
This application of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit the admis-
sibility of coerced confessions in state courts has become known as the
"voluntariness test." If a confession is found to have been obtained
from a defendant involuntarily, then it will not be admissible as evidence
against the defendant. The voluntariness test has been applied to de-
termine the admissibility of statements obtained from children as well
as adults.3 1
28. Id. at 717 n.4, 99 S. Ct. at 2568 n.4.
29. 297 U.S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461 (1936).
30. Id. at 286, 56 S. Ct. at 465 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316,
47 S. Ct. 103, 104 (1926)).
31. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S. Ct. 302 (1948). and Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49, 82 S. Ct. 1209 (1962). Both of these cases involved juveniles tried and
convicted as adults in criminal court. However, the due process standard articulated in
the two cases is (or at least should be) equally applicable to delinquency proceedings. In
both cases, the age of the defendants (fifteen and fourteen respectively) and their lengthy
police interrogations without the presence of a parent, attorney or other friendly adult
swung the pendulum of the involuntariness test in their favor. Commenting on the age
factor, the Supreme Court in Haley noted "when, as here, a mere child-an easy victim
of the law-is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used." Haley,
332 U.S. at 599, 68 S. Ct. at 303-04.
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The admissibility of confessions under the "voluntariness test" was
and continues to be determined according to a highly discretionary
"totality of the circumstances" examination of the events surrounding
the confession. Since the discretionary aspect of the decision-making in
such cases invariably leads to inconsistent results, the "voluntariness
test" has been routinely criticized for providing insufficient protection
to criminal defendants against coerced confessions.
The Supreme Court's agreement with such criticism and its attempt
to remedy the problem is illustrated by, its later decisions in Escobedo
v. Illinois32 and Miranda v. Arizona.31 Escobedo is the culmination of
a progression of decisions in which the Supreme Court attached in-
creasing importance to a suspect's right to counsel during the interro-
gation process.- In Escobedo, the Court held that deprivation of a
defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment would render
any subsequently obtained evidence inadmissible if the denial occurred
in certain specific factual situations." Though the Escobedo Court mainly
concerned itself with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it made a
passing reference to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination when it stated that the accused had a right to be advised by
his lawyer of the privilege. Thus, an interplay between the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination emerged.
In Miranda v. Arizona,"6 decided two years after Escobedo, the
Supreme Court established a broad privilege against self-incrimination
and very specific procedural safeguards to protect it. The Court held
32. 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964).
33. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
34. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964). See also, Massiah v.
U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199 (1964). It is useful to note that Escobedo concerned
a state prosecution and Massiah concerned a federal prosecution. Also, see the four-
member dissent in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 S. Ct. 1287 (1958) and the
four-member concurrence in Spano v. N.Y., 360 U.S. 315, 79 S. Ct. 1202 (1959).
35. The Court in Escobedo stated
We hold ... that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and
the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right
to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as "made obligatory upon
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment," (citations omitted) and that no
statement elicited by the police during the investigation may be used against
him at a criminal trial.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-491, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (1964).
36. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
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that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant
way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-
incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be em-
ployed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective
means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence
and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously
honored, the following measures are required. [The suspect] must
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in
a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. 3'
Miranda is generally considered a milestone in legal history and is one
of the most controversial decisions of the Supreme Court. Many critics
have called for a complete overruling of Miranda.3 In addition to
external critics, the Court itself in recent years has shown a distaste for
the requirements and implications of Miranda and has sought to eliminate
or at least drastically mitigate the import of its commands. 39 This nar-
rowing of Miranda should be kept in mind when considering Miranda's
application in delinquency proceedings.
Finally, assuming Miranda is applicable, the most important issue
in the context of confessions obtained by police interrogation is whether
the confession was obtained subsequent to a valid waiver of the suspect's
right to counsel and right to silence. The standard for evaluating whether
37. Id. at 478-479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630.
38. For example, in an attempt to overrule the strict warning requirements of Miranda
in federal prosecutions, Congress passed Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988), which essentially reinstates the "voluntar-
iness" test as the measure of the admissibility of confessions. However, the statute has
rarely been used and to date no ruling on the constitutionality of the statute has been
made.
39. See, e.g.. New York v. Harris, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643 (1971), where the
Court allowed statements taken in violation of Miranda to be used to impeach the
defendant. The only restriction placed upon the use of such.statements was that they had
to be "voluntary," i.e. tested against the Fourteenth Amendment's "voluntariness" test.
See also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984) where the
Supreme Court created a public safety exception to Miranda.
Concerning the waiver issue, see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S. Ct. 1135
(1986) where the Court held that a suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights will be effective
even though the police (1) decline to tell the stispect that a lawyer has been retained for
him and (2) effectively prevent the lawyer from seeing the suspect.
Most significantly, see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985) in
which the Court held that a second admission obtained from a suspect following an
unwarned admission by the suspect was admissible since the suspect had been warned
prior to the second admission.
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the waiver was indeed valid is whether it was made in a "voluntary,
knowing and intelligent" manner. This standard parallels the voluntar-
iness test of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is a "facts and circum-
stances" sort of test where a great deal of discretion is vested in the
trial judge. It should be noted that the right to counsel and the privilege
against self-incrimination create two separate waiver issues and accord-
ingly are afforded separate treatment.'4 It should also be noted that the
Court appears to attach little or no significance to the "knowing and
intelligent" prong of the waiver standard.4 In other words, as long as
the Court can find that there was no police coercion in a suspect's
waiver of his rights to counsel and silence, the waiver will be valid
regardless of how irrational a suspect may have been in waiving the
rights. Such an approach does not bode well for children, who are less
capable than adults of making knowing and intelligent decisions.
2. Under the State Constitution
A parallel provision to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination can be found in article I, section 16 of the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution which provides in part that [njo person shall be compelled
to give evidence against himself.''42 Supplementing that provision is
Article I, Section 13 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution which provides
that "any person ... arrested or detained in connection with the in-
vestigation or commission of any offense ... shall be advised fully of
the reason for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his
right against self-incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel
and, if indigent, his right to court appointed counsel." '4 A "plain
meaning" reading of the above section and an analysis of the legislative
40. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885 (1981)
where the Court held that "an accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Once the suspect has asserted
a desire to have counsel, the police may not question him again prior to supplying him
with that counsel (unless the suspect himself initiates the communication). An accused's
request to see an attorney is a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
Also, see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975), where the Court
suggests that a defendant's assertion of his right to remain silent that terminates a first
interrogation does not bar the police from questioning the suspect later as long as a
"substantial period" has elapsed between the invocation of the right and the subsequent
resumption of the interrogation.
41. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
42. La. Const. art. I, § 16.
43. La. Const. art. 1, § 13.
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history behind the section illustrate that the framers intended to fully
adopt the requirements of Miranda."
Two significant distinctions should be noted between the federal and
state provisions for the privilege against self-incrimination. First, by
incorporating the Miranda warnings into Section 13 of the Louisiana
Constitution, such warnings will continue to be required even if the
United States Supreme Court subsequently overrules Miranda. Secondly,
Louisiana law does appear to attach significance to the "knowing and
intelligent" prong of the standard for waiver .4
III. ARTICLE 808: A POSITIVE STEP BUT...
Article 808's extension to accused juveniles of constitutional rights
equal to those possessed by accused adults (except for the right to a
jury trial) is a positive step for the Louisiana juvenile justice system.
With the addition of Article 808, the delinquency determination has
been made fairer to the child and less ambiguous to the juvenile justice
personnel who formerly were confronted with the difficult question of
which rights should and should not be extended to children in light of
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the issue. The history of the
juvenile court has proven that the dispensation of "justice" without
constitutional procedures to define the process is nothing more than a
revival of the Star Chamber with its inherent danger of vesting too
much unrestrained power in the state.
Article 808 is the logical extension of a process of constitutional
domestication"6 begun by the United States Supreme Court in 1966 in
In re Gault . 7 The Gault Court observed that "unbridled discretion,
however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for
principle and procedure."" Justice Fortas, in writing for the Gault
majority, further observed:
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process
has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of
44. State of Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 Verbatim Transcripts, Sep-
tember 1-7, 1973, Vol. XII1, pp. 68-112. Vol. XIV, pp. 1-51; Lee Hargrave, The Declaration
of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. i, 40-48 (1974).
45. See State v. Glover, 343 So. 2d 118 (La. 1976) (where the court found that
internal coercion was sufficient to render a confession involuntary). Also, see State v.
Rankin, 357 So. 2d 803 (La. 1978). Compare with the federal approach at supra note
41.
46. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1441 (1967). The Gault Court
uses this term to refer to its principle that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone," id. at 13, 87 S. Ct. at 1436, and its extension of
certain constitutional rights and procedural protections to accused juveniles in a delinquency
proceeding.
47. 387 U.S. I, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
48. Id. at 18, 87 S. Ct. at 1439.
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unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings
of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process
is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual free-
dom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact
which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers
which the state may exercise .... But, in addition, the proce-
dural rules . . . are our best instruments for the distillation and
evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data
that life and our adversary methods present. . . . "Procedure is
to law what 'scientific method' is to science. ' 49
In other words, though the constitutional domestication of the juvenile
court in part arose out of a desire to insure a more accurate fact-finding
process (i.e. to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth), it was even
more so designed to better balance the allocation of power between the
state and the individual, in this case a child.
The Gault Court rejected the traditionally touted justifications of
parens patriae and the belief that the proceedings were neither adversarial
nor criminal in nature as reasons to curtail the constitutional rights of
accused juveniles. In fact, in addition to extending to children certain
constitutional rights to be applicable in the adjudicatory stage of delin-
quency proceedings, the Court held that juvenile delinquency proceedings
were to be regarded as criminal in nature. The Court found that such
a holding was mandated by the fact that a child adjudicated delinquent
could face a loss of liberty and stigmatization as a result of the process.
As a consequence, the Gault Court, in criticizing the lack of pro-
cedures in the juvenile justice system, advised: "[slo wide a gulf between
the State's treatment of the adult and of the child requires a bridge
sturdier than mere verbiage, and reasons more persuasive than clich
can provide." 0 The drafters of Children's Code article 808 heeded this
advice and created Article 808 in response to their inability to find
reasons beyond clich6 for affording children in delinquency proceedings
with fewer rights and procedural protections than those granted to adults
in criminal prosecutions. Thus, Article 808 carries the torch of Gault
further by extending to children in all stages of delinquency proceedings
the same constitutional rights and procedural protections (except the
right to jury trial) guaranteed to adults in criminal prosecutions.
In a practical sense, however, a gulf continues to separate children
from adults in our society. In order for children to truly be able to
exercise their rights on at least an equal basis with adults, in some
contexts a new bridge needs to be built by providing additional pro-
49. Id. at 19-20, 87 S. Ct. 1439-1440 (quoting in part Foster, Social Work, the Law,
and Social Action, in Social Casework, July 1964, pp. 383, 386).
50. 387 U.S. at 29-30, 87 S. Ct. at 1445.
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cedural safeguards for children beyond those currently granted to adults.
The analytical framework utilized by the Court in Gault could serve as
the standard by which such proposed additional procedures could be
analyzed.
Though the Gault holding was rather narrow," the analytical frame-
work which the Court used to extend procedural protections to delin-
quency proceedings was much broader. The Court utilized a "fundamental
fairness" theory52 to extend the constitutional protections of advance
notice of the charges, assistance of counsel, and opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses." The Court used a "functional equivalence ' '5 4
theory to extend the privilege against self-incrimination." Professor Ro-
senberg has penned the concurrent application of these two theories as
the "dual-maximal" standard56 and has noted that "[tihe advantage of
the dual-maximal standard ... is that it applies to children all the
guarantees already applicable to adult criminal defendants, while also
permitting enhanced protection of children because of their vulnerability
and immaturity without making the additional protection automatically
available to adults.'1 7
Thus, in summary, Article 808 is a positive step for children in
Louisiana and the juvenile justice system. It solves the first half of the
problem which the United States Supreme Court recognized in Kent v.
United States, that "there may be grounds for concern that the child
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.""8 However, the second half of the problem
remains unresolved. Consequently, every time a right or protection is
at issue, the question should be asked whether children because of their
51. See supra text accompanying note 10.
52. Basically, this approach holds that only those rights which are "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" are applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332 (1934).
Under this view of due process, a particular procedure may be required even if it
is not one that the Bill of Rights guarantees. Conversely, all of the Bill of Rights guarantees
are not automatically applicable. To be applicable, they must first jump the "essential
to fundamental fairness" hurdle. This view is similar to the "fundamental rights" approach
to due process.
53. Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal
for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 656, 665-66 (1980).
54. This view functionally equates delinquency proceedings with criminal trials, such
that all rights and procedural protections extended to adults are likewise extended to
juveniles. This approach is similar to the selective incorporation approach to due process.
55. Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 665-66.
56. Id. at 669, 671.
57. Id. at 671.
58. Id. at 661, 383 U.S. at 556, 86 S. Ct. at 1054 (1966).
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unique characteristics and status need greater protections than those
extended to adults. 59
IV. CURRENTLY EXISTING ADDITIONAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. Dino' is
illustrative of an additional protection, extended to children beyond the
protections extended to adults because of the unique characteristics and
status of children. The issue in Dino was the validity of the waiver of
the rights to silence (i.e. the privilege against self-incrimination) and
counsel by a juvenile. The Dino court held that waivers of the right to
silence and counsel by juveniles must be evaluated according to a per
se standard. The standard which the Dino court articulated requires that
three conditions be met before a juvenile's waiver of Miranda rights
can be valid, namely: (1) that the juvenile actually consulted with an
attorney or an adult before waiver; (2) that the attorney or adult
consulted was interested in the welfare of the juvenile; and (3) where
an adult other than an attorney was consulted, that adult was fully
advised of the rights of the juvenile .6 The court rejected the totality
of the circumstances approach for evaluating waivers by juveniles because
of its tendency to mire the courts in a morass of speculation similar
to that from which Miranda was designed to extricate them in adult
cases. The court believed that a per se approach would add greater
assurance to the determination of whether a child had "knowingly and
intelligently" waived his rights.
The Dino holding is in direct contrast to the United States Supreme
Court's holding on the issue of waivers of the rights to silence and
counsel by juveniles. In Fare v. Michael C.,12 a five to four decision,
the Court adhered to its endorsement of the totality-of-circumstances
test for evaluating whether a waiver of Miranda rights had been made
in a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" manner, regardless of the
fact that the waiver being evaluated was that of a juvenile rather than
an adult.63
With respect to the right to counsel aspect, Dino is codified in
Article 810" of the Louisiana Children's Code and thus continues to
apply to children even with the enactment of Article 808. Without Article
810, it could have been argued that Article 808 implicitly overruled the
Dino per se standard since the article equates the constitutional rights
59. 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045 (1966).
60. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
61. Id.
62. 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
64. La. Ch.C. art. 810 (West 1991).
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and protections of delinquency proceedings with those of criminal de-
fendants. Possibly, the right to silence (i.e. privilege against self-incrim-
ination) aspect of Dino has been implicitly overruled but the better
argument appears to be that it survives in spite of Article 808's enactment
due to its constitutional dimension.
Arguably, the Dino rule was at least a start in granting Louisiana
children the procedural devices necessary to insure that they are truly
able to understand and competently utilize the constitutional rights to
which they are entitled. The Dino rule reflects empirical evidence which
suggests that under the traditional Miranda approach children are simply
not understanding their rights nor competently utilizing them. For ex-
ample, one empirical study showed that children younger than fifteen
years of age misunderstood at least one of the four standard Miranda
statements and in comparison with adults, demonstrated significantly
poorer comprehension of the nature and significance of their Miranda
rights. 6
Other non-empirical observations were made by the Dino court. For
example, the court quoted appeals court Judge Fedoroff who in State
ex rel. Holifield stated: "I cannot fathom how a minor, who lacks the
capacity to sell, mortgage, donate or release (who could not even contract
with the lawyer whose services he waives) can be said to possess the
capacity to waive constitutional privileges and lose his freedom as a
consequence."" In addition, the Dino court noted that
[a]lthough the Miranda [C]ourt did not express itself specifically
on the special needs of juveniles confronted with police inter-
rogation, the reasons given for making the warnings an absolute
prerequisite to interrogation point up the need for an absolute
requirement that juveniles not be permitted to waive constitu-
tional rights on their own. 67
In other words, the Dino court was saying that the same reasons that
justify Miranda in fact justify the imposition of additional safeguards
to protect the rights of children."
65. Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 Cal. L. Rev. 1134 (1980).
66. 319 So. 2d 471, 475 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975) (Fedoroff, J., concurring).
67. State cx rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 591 (La. 1978).
68. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the Miranda decision depends on one's
view of the role of confessions in combating crime in our society and the proper balance
of power between the individual and the state. This author believes that the principles
advocated and established in Miranda are good ones. Why would the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination be included in the Bill of Rights if the intent was that
the people should not understand the right and consequently be ineffective in utilizing it
to protect themselves from the power of the state? However, it is possible that an alternative
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Although Dino was a start, it may not go far enough. The as-
sumptions underlying its creation, namely that the presence of the child's
parents would benefit the child because the parents' interests would be
aligned with the child and the parents would understand their child's
rights and effectively advise him or her, may be invalid. Conflicting
interests 9 between the child and his parent(s), emotional reactions by
the parents to their child's detention or the ignorance of the parents
may render the parents unable to provide the support and counsel which
the child needs. 0 Evidence from one empirical study corroborates this
possibility. The study found that parental presence during interrogation
may actually be detrimental rather than helpful to the child's under-
standing of his rights and ability to effectively utilize them since many
of the parents studied did not directly advise their children about the
waiver and the ones who did almost always urged the child to waive
his rights."'
Thus, in summary, Dino was a good faith attempt to provide in
the waiver context an additional procedure for children that took into
account the unique characteristics and status of children. In more specific
terms, the Dino court was attempting to provide a fair procedure for
the waiver of rights that reflected the generally reduced competency of
children. However, as already noted, Dino may not do enough and new
questions arise. What additional protections are necessary to insure that
children can understand and competently exercise their rights to silence
(i.e. privilege against self-incrimination) and counsel? Does Article 808
preclude the courts from creating constitutional protections for children
beyond those for adults, thereby reserving such determinations for the
legislature? Arguably, Article 808 does not act as a preclusion since if
a right is of constitutional dimension, it should be extended regardless
of what the legislature has said. If so, then the issue becomes whether
the Louisiana Constitution requires the protection, since at the present
time, it is clear that the United States Constitution as currently inter-
preted does not require such additional protections for children.
or alternatives (for example, videotaping of police interrogation) to Miranda can be
developed that would preserve its underlying principles and motivations and thereby allow
Miranda to be dismantled. However, until such an alternative or alternatives are available
and being effectively utilized, this author believes that the commands of Miranda should
be followed.
69. Note that Louisiana Children's Code article 810(C) attempts to eliminate at least
some of the conflict by providing for the appointment of an attorney for the child
whenever the interest of the child and his parents or other adult advisor conflict.
70. Grisso, supra note 65, at 1142.
71. T. Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights: Legal and Psychological Competence, at
187, 200 (1981).
19921 1155
1156 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR
CHILDREN IN THE WAIVER OF RIGHTS CONTEXT
If the Dino procedural requirements are not sufficent to insure that
a child understands and competently exercises or waives his rights to
silence and counsel, then what procedures would advance those ends?
Several alternative procedures are available.
First, a per se rule could be adopted requiring a juvenile to consult
with an attorney at least once before a waiver of his rights to silence
and counsel will be deemed valid. Texas adopted such a provision in
1973. However, since then, Texas has amended the statute so as to
significantly reduce its impact. 2 Yet, even the current watered-down
Texas statute is note-worthy in requiring that a child be advised of his
Miranda rights by a magistrate. In addition, if a waiver is made, it
must be made in writing in the presence of a magistrate independent
of the presence of a law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney.
Second, an even more protective approach is not only to require
that the juvenile consult with an attorney before waiving any rights but
also to make the juvenile's right to counsel nonwaivable. This is the
position taken by the Juvenile Justice Standards Project" as well as a
number of commentators. 4
72. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.09 (Vernon 1991).
73. Institute of Judicial Administration and American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice
Standards Project, (hereinafter referred to as Juvenile Justice Standards Project), Standard
3.2 which relates to Standards Relating to Police Handling of Juvenile Problems (1980)
recommends that:
Police investigation into criminal matters should be similar whether the suspect
is an adult or a juvenile. Juveniles, therefore, should receive at least the same
safeguards available to adults in the criminal justice system. This should apply
to:
A. preliminary investigations (e.g., stop and frisk);
B. the arrest process;
C. search and seizure;
D. questioning;
E. pretrial identification; and
F. prehearing detention and release.
For some investigative procedures, greater constitutional safeguards are needed
because of the vulnerability of juveniles. Juveniles should not be permitted to
waive constitutional rights on their own. In certain investigative areas not gov-
erned by constitutional guidelines, guidance to police officers should be provided
either legislatively or administratively by court rules or through police agency
policies.
Standard 5.1, Standards Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings, (1980) recommends that
"[!In delinquency cases, the juvenile should have the effective assistance of counsel at all
stages of the proceeding" and that this right to counsel should be mandatory and
nonwaivable.
74. See, e.g., Grisso, supra note 65, at 1163-1164 and Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court. 69 Minn. L. Rev. 141, 184-90 (1984).
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All of these procedures present very viable, and arguably more
effective, alternatives to Louisiana's current approach to insuring that
any waiver of a child's constitutional rights is made in a knowing and
intelligent manner. In varying degrees, they all provide the child access
to the most potent weapon he can utilize to defend him against the
powerful forces of the state: an attorney.
V. CONCLUSION
Article 808 equates the constitutional rights of accused juveniles with
those of accused adults. As a result, the article grants to children in
Louisiana greater rights than they had previously possessed under the
United States or Louisiana Constitutions as interpreted by the respective
supreme courts.
With respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination, Article 808 makes Miranda" specifically applicable to accused
juveniles. Though this was no new innovation in Louisiana due to the
presence of Dino 6 and other Louisiana cases holding that Miranda
applies to juveniles, it does go beyond the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Fare v. Michael C."
Article 808's enactment was a positive step on behalf of children
in Louisiana since as Justice Fortas in Gault noted, "unbridled discretion,
however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for
principle and procedure." 7" However, the equating of the rights of
children with adults may be insufficient in certain contexts to insure
that children can truly understand and exercise those rights on an equal
basis, with adults. In those contexts where the adult proceduies are
insufficient to protect the rights of children, additional safeguards for
children need to be implemented.
This comment has suggested that within the specific context of the
waiver of Miranda rights, children need additional protections beyond
those available to adults. As a class, children simply are not as competent
as adults to make decisions concerning the waivers of these rights. In
addition, children sometimes do not even understand what their rights
are, despite the giving of Miranda warnings.
With Dino and its subsequent codification in the Children's Code,' 9
Louisiana has implemented an additional protection for children within
the waiver of Miranda rights context. However, the Dino rule may be
insufficient to protect children from their lack of knowledge and relative
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
76. State ex rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
77. 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
78. 387 U.S. at 18, 87 S. Ct. at 1439.
79. La. Ch.C. art. 810 (West 1991).
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incompetence. This comment has presented several procedures that could
function as more effective alternatives to the Dino rule. These alternative
procedures should be carefully examined by the legislature and the courts
with an eye toward adopting the procedure(s) which would best insure
that children who do waive their Miranda rights are doing so in a
knowing and intelligent manner.
In addition, in contexts beyond the waiver of Miranda rights, the
legislature and the courts should be ever vigilant to provide children
with the additional protections they need to safeguard their constitutional
rights whenever their unique characteristics and status so require. Such
vigilance will insure that children receive the best of both worlds to
which the Kent Court refers: the protections accorded to adults and the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.10
Jan Kirby Byland
80. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556. 86 S. Ct. 1045, 1054 (1966).
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